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Are Foreign Sovereigns Entitled to Constitutional
Due Process? The Ninth Circuit's Analysis of
Personal Jurisdiction in Altmann v. Republic of
Austria
I. Introduction
Over sixty-five years after Hitler's declaration of the
Anschluss, when Jews were forced to flee from their Austrian
homeland, a glimmer of gold sheds light on the legacy of those
who lost everything during the Nazi reign. Six gilded paintings by
famed Austrian artist Gustav Klimt1 are the subject of suit in
Altmann v. Republic of Austria (Altmann I]).2 In Altmann II, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss Maria
Altmann's claim to recover the masterworks allegedly stolen from
her family by the Nazis in the 1940s3 and later possessed by the
I For a journey through the life of famed Austrian Art Nouveau painter, Gustav
Klimt (1862-1918), see generally COLIN B. BAILEY & GUSTAV KLIMT, GUSTAV KLIMT:
MODERNISM IN THE MAKING (Colin B. Bailey ed., 2001) (surveying Klimt's elegant and
glittering contributions to the world of art at the turn of the century).
2 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2003) (No. 03-13) [hereinafter "Altmann Ir'].
3 For a comprehensive account of the systematic pillaging of Jewish-owned
artwork during World War II, see HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI
CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997).
[B]etween 1939 and 1944, the Nazis systematically confiscated, stole,
or bought works from a number of European collections, or from
private collections belonging to wealthy Jewish families .... In the
end, hundreds of thousands of paintings, priceless sculptures, and
drawings by the great masters - as well as millions of books,
manuscripts, and other cultural artifacts - were taken from across
Europe. These were the spoils of war.
Id. at 16; see also THE SPOILS OF WAR: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE Loss,
REAPPEARANCE, AND RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (Elizabeth Simpson, ed., 1997)
(documenting presented papers, photographs, and legal texts related to repatriation
efforts of the 1995 international symposium held at the Bard Graduate Center in New
York where government officials, curators, historians, and others presented papers
regarding the vast amounts of art and cultural property displaced as a result of World
War I1).
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Austrian Gallery.4
With the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act' (FSIA) as its
canvas, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the FSIA could be
applied retroactively to an event occurring before 1952,6 when the
U.S. Department of State adopted a restrictive theory7 of foreign
state immunity. Although the Ninth Circuit did not reach the
district court's 8 broad conclusion that the FSIA may be generally
applied to pre-1952 events,9 the court held that Austria could not
have expected to receive immunity for its complicity in the Nazi's
discriminatory expropriation of the treasured art collection. °
Thus, finding Austria subject to jurisdiction in the United States,"
the Ninth Circuit added its own gloss to the foreign sovereign
immunity canvas.
In Part II, this note will explore the historical basis and
practical application of the FSIA. Part III will illuminate the facts
of Altmann H and the respective decisions by the United States
District Court for the Central District of California and the Ninth
Circuit. Part IV will challenge the district court's personal
jurisdiction analysis and discuss the proper personal jurisdiction
inquiry as employed by the Ninth Circuit. Finally, Part V will
conclude that the Ninth Circuit's extension of constitutional
protections to foreign sovereigns is the correct approach to the
personal jurisdiction inquiry in transnational disputes.
II. The Federal Sovereign Immunities Act
A. History of the Statute
Until 1952, foreign sovereign immunity was considered "a
matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and
4 See Altmann 1l, 317 F.3d at 959-61.
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2003).
6 Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 962-67.
7 See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
8 See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
[hereinafter "Altmann 1"].
9 Altmann I1, 317 F.3d at 962-63.
10 Id. at 965.
11 Id. at 969.
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not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. '1 2 Consequently, the
executive branch (particularly the State Department) adjudicated
issues of foreign sovereign immunity, often determining that
immunity should be granted in actions involving friendly foreign
sovereigns. 3 In 1952, however, Jack B. Tate announced the State
Department's adoption of the modem "restrictive theory" of
foreign sovereign immunity in the renowned "Tate Letter."' 4
Thus, while the absolute theory of immunity surmises that all
states are equal and that no state may exercise authority over any
other state, the restrictive theory holds that states are subject to the
authority of other states for their commercial or private sovereign
acts.' 5  In practice, the State Department was responsible for
determining on a case-by-case basis whether a foreign sovereign
had engaged in commercial activity. This process was neither
clear nor uniform in application, 6 which led to the passage of the
FSIA in 1976.' 7  Seeking to clarify the standards of foreign
12 Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812)) (establishing the notion that foreign
sovereigns are generally granted immunity from suit in United States courts).
13 See Verlinden, id. at 486.
14 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
A study of the law of sovereign immunity reveals the existence of two
conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory of
sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis).
Id.
15 See id; see also Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (noting
the differences between the restrictive and absolute theories of sovereign immunity).
16 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposal for
Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 906-09 (1969).
17 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1847, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6604,
6606.
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch,
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sovereign immunity and to create legal standards whereby such
issues could be adjudicated, Congress vested the judicial branch
with the power to resolve foreign sovereign immunity issues."8
B. Scope of the FSIA and the Expropriation Exception
Under the FSIA, a foreign state' is immune to the jurisdiction
of United States courts unless one of the following exceptions2 °
applies: waiver of immunity, actions based on commercial activity,
expropriation claims, property claims, and certain tortious acts
occurring in the United States.2' If one of the enumerated
exceptions applies, the party claiming the immunity must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the exception does not
apply. Although the commercial activity exception has been
thoroughly litigated, the expropriation exception has received less
attention.23 The exception provides that foreign states are not
immune from jurisdiction in United States courts where:
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity
determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions
are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure
due process.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2003) ("Congress finds that the determination by United
States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign
states and litigants in United States courts.")
18 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2003) (defining a "foreign state" as including "a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined
in subsection (b)").
20 Since its enactment in 1976, the FSIA has been amended to include two
additional exceptions in foreign sovereign immunity cases. In 1988, Congress passed an
arbitration amendment, governing actions to confirm or enforce arbitral awards issued in
the United States or pursuant to an international agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)
(2003). In addition, Congress amended the FSIA in 1996 as part of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to include an immunity exception for specified
terrorist activities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2003).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2003).
22 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (applying the rule in
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 1017 (1993)).
23 See Benjamin Eric Lovell, Export Group v. Reef Industries, Inc.: The
Reconciliation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 21 N.C. J. INT'L. L &
COM. REG. 443,455 (1996).
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[r]ights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for
such property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.24
Thus, the statute and interpretive case law requires that in order
to find subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation
exception, a court must determine: "1) that rights in property are at
issue, 2) that the property was taken in violation of international
law, and 3) that either of the two jurisdictional nexus requirements
of the statute are satisfied.,
25
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
A wealthy sugar magnate, Ferdinand Bloch, commissioned a
portrait of his wife, Adele, by the Austrian artist, Gustav Klimt.26
Before Adele's death in 1925, she owned six Klimt paintings,
including her gilded portrait, Adele Bloch-Bauer I, as well as Adele
Bloch-Bauer II, Amalie Zuckerkandl, Apple Tree I, Beechwood,
and Houses in Unterach am Attersee2 7 Although she asked her
husband to donate the paintings to the Austrian Gallery upon his
death, probate hearings indicated that the paintings belonged to
Ferdinand's estate. 8
Once the relentless persecution of the Jews commenced under
Nazi rule, Ferdinand, a Jew, fled to Switzerland, leaving all of his
belongings behind in his native Austria.29 During the liquidation
of Ferdinand's estate, the paintings were traded and sold until they
24 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2003).
25 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist
Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 660, 663 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
26 Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).
27 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
28 Id. at 1192-93.
29 Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 959.
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eventually rested in the possession of the Austrian Gallery.3 °
Before Ferdinand's death in 1945, he willed his entire estate to his
nephew and two nieces, including Maria Altmann, but made no
bequest to the Austrian Gallery.3"
The Second Republic of Austria declared that all dealings
under discriminatory Nazi rule were void in 1946.32 The official
policy, however, was undermined in practice because the Republic
often required the original owner to pay the purchase price in
exchange for the appropriated item.3 In an effort to preserve
Austrian cultural heritage, the Republic also prohibited designated
paintings from being exported.34 Thus, the Republic reaped many
treasured pieces by using the export license law to force Jews to
trade artwork for export permits.35  Behind the fagade of
restitutionary policies, Ferdinand's heirs were unable to recover
the paintings except for Houses in Unterach, which Altmann's
brother had previously recovered from a private collection.36
In 1948, the Austrian Gallery learned that although Adele's
will requested that her husband donate the paintings to the Gallery,
she did not in fact bequeath them to the museum. 37 Despite the
tenuous legal effect of Adele's will, Ferdinand's heirs, represented
by their lawyer, acknowledged the validity of Adele's will by
donating the six paintings mentioned in exchange for export
permits to recover the family's other artworks.38
In 1998, the Austrian journalist Hubertus Czernin uncovered
Austrian attempts to garner treasured artwork from exiled Jews at
the end of the war.39 In response, Austria passed a restitution law
in 1998 ordering the return of certain artwork to their original
owners. The committee reviewing claims, however, recommended
30 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1193-94.
35 Id. at 1194.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002).
39 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
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against the return of the Klimt paintings to the Bloch-Bauer heirs.4 °
Maria Altmann, a U.S. citizen and the last living heir to the Bloch-
Bauer estate, challenged the committee's recommendation in a suit
in Austria.4 ' But she was later forced to abandon her complaint
because of the exorbitant filing fees imposed by Austrian law.42
Determined to recover her family's precious artworks, Maria
Altmann filed suit in the United States Central District of
California against the Republic of Austria and the Austrian
Gallery.43
B. The United States District Court for the Central District of
California
The Republic of Austria and the Austrian Gallery moved to
dismiss Altmann's claim for lack of jurisdiction,44 arguing that
they were immune from suit because the FSIA did not apply to
pre-1952 events.45 The district court disagreed and concluded that
the FSIA did apply to pre-1952 events46 and that it had jurisdiction
over defendants by virtue of the expropriation exception47 to the
FSIA.
1. The FSIA applies to pre-1952 events
Defendants argued that because the FSIA was enacted to
codify the restrictive principle of foreign sovereign immunity and
because the principle was not the prevailing law until 1952, the
FSIA could not apply to events before 1952.48 Although the FSIA
"provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state in the courts of this country,, 49 the court sought to clarify the
scope of the FSIA to determine whether its application
encompassed events pre-dating the issuance of the Tate Letter in
40 Id. at 1196.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 961.
44 Id. at 1197.
45 Id. at 1198.
46 Id. at 1199.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2003).
48 Id.
49 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
2003]
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1952.50 The district court conceded that case law out of the
Eleventh Circuit,5' the District of Columbia Circuit,52 and the
Second Circuit53 supported the defendants' position that they were
entitled to absolute foreign sovereign immunity as it existed prior
to the issuance of the Tate Letter. The court reasoned, however,
that in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products,54 the FSIA permissibly applies to
pre-1952 events. 5  Under the Landgraf analysis, retroactive
application of a statute is permissible where jurisdictional issues
are implicated and impermissible where the alteration of
substantive rights is at issue.56 Consequently, the court found
50 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
51 See Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11 t1 Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987) (holding that because the FSIA could not be applied
retroactively, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought
against the People's Republic of China for payment of bearer bonds issued by the
Imperial Government of China in 1911 and which matured in 1951).
52 See Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D.D.C. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987) (holding that receipt holder could not recover money due
on receipts for interest in arrears because the FSIA was not intended by Congress to be
applied to pre-1952 events); see also Lin v. Gov't of Japan, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6061,
at *4 (D.D.C. May 6, 1994) (holding that the FSIA should not apply to events prior to
1952).
53 See Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988) (holding that a class of holders of debt
instruments issued by the Russian Imperial Government could not recover interest under
the commercial exception to the FSIA because the Act did not apply to commercial
transactions occurring before 1952).
54 Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
55 See id. at 280.
The court stated that:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the
court's first task is to determine whether Congress had expressly prescribed the
statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to
resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such
express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have
retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he
acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed.
Id. (adopting the test whereby retroactive application of a statute is permissible where
jurisdictional issues affecting where the case will be heard are implicated and
impermissible where the alteration of substantive rights is at issue).
56 Id. at 274.
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retroactive application of the act permissible because the FSIA
does not "impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed."57  Rather, it is a
jurisdictional statute that "simply changes the tribunal that is to
hear the case."' 8
2. The Expropriation Exception to the FSIA Applies
Once the court determined that the FSIA was a jurisdictional
statute that could apply retroactively, it ventured to employ an
exception to the FSIA. Finding that the expropriation exception to
the FSIA applied, the district court relied on the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,59 which
held that a United States citizen could sue for misappropriation of
his hotel by the Argentine government under the expropriation
exception to the FSIA.6° In Siderman de Blake, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Republic of Argentina's solicitation of guests in the
United States, the patronage of United States citizens at the hotel,
and the receipt of payment in the United States for reservations, 1
constituted a "commercial activity" within the expropriation
exception to the FSIA.62 Employing a similar rationale, the district
court reasoned that the Gallery's actions of publishing a guidebook
in English, advertising museum events within the United States,
and the attraction of United States tourists to the Gallery
constituted "commercial activity" sufficient to satisfy the
exception.63
3. Personal Jurisdiction
The district court then examined the defendants' argument that
even if the expropriation exception applied, the plaintiffs suit
57 Id. at 280.
58 Princz v. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
59 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993).
60 Id. at 712-713.
61 Id. at 709.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2003).
63 SeeAltmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1204-05 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
2003)
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failed for lack of personal jurisdiction.64 In a bold assertion which
will be further analyzed in Part IV, the district court found that it
could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants,
concluding that foreign sovereigns are not "persons" for purposes
of constitutional due process. 65 The court primarily relied on the
Supreme Court's due process inquiry in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc.66 In Weltover, Justice Scalia stated in dicta that
prior precedent indicated that the Court could assume that due
process was fulfilled without deciding whether foreign states were
"persons" for due process purposes.67 Following the Court's
suggestion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach68 that States of the
Union are not "persons" for the purposes of the Due Process
Clause,69 the Altmann I court concluded that foreign states were
not persons for due process purposes.7"
4. Forum Non Conveniens
Concluding that Austria did not provide an adequate
alternative forum for Altmann's claim, the district court refused to
dismiss plaintiffs claim under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.7" If undertaken in Austria, Altmann's suit would be
barred under the thirty year statute of limitations for stolen works
of art and would require Altmann to incur "oppresively
burdensome" filing fees, which would likely deplete all of her
assets. Thus, the court concluded that the United States District
Court for the Central District of California was the proper forum
for the resolution of Altmann's claim.
64 Id. at 1206-08.
65 Id. at 1207.
66 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding that the Republic of Argentina's default on certain
bonds issued as part of a plan to stabilize its currency was an act falling within the
commercial activity exception to the FSIA).
67 Id. at 619.
68 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
69 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001). For an in-depth discussion of
the district court's rationale, see infra Part IV.
70 Id. at 1210.
71 Id. at 1209-10. In fact, after Altmann won a reduction in the filing fees, Austria
appealed the decision, contending that plaintiff should be required to pay more than the
$200,000 fee. See id.
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5. Joinder of Parties
Considering whether the other heirs were necessary and
indispensable parties under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,72 the court squarely held that Altmann was the proper
representative of the heirs' claims and therefore her claim could
not be dismissed for failure to join necessary parties.73
6. Venue
In a last attempt to quash Altmann's claim, defendants argued
improper venue. The district court, however, deemed venue
proper under the venue provision of the FSIA.74 Finding a
correlation between the expropriation exception's term
"commercial activity" and the venue provision's term, "doing
business," the district court upheld venue based on its conclusion
that it could "find no authority that suggests that a foreign agency
or instrumentality that engages in 'commercial activity' within a
district is not also 'doing business' within a district."75
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision upon the defendants'
appeal of the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss. The
court focused on the lower court's finding that the FSIA applied
retroactively to pre-1952 acts and that the misappropriation of the
paintings fell within the expropriation exception to the FSIA.
7 6
Affirming the district court's grant of jurisdiction, the Ninth
Circuit addressed (1) the grant of subject matter jurisdiction under
the FSIA; (2) the existence of personal jurisdiction over the
Republic of Austria and the Gallery; (3) whether the applicability
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens required transfer of
jurisdiction to Austria; (4) whether all necessary parties had been
joined in the action; and (5) the appropriateness of venue in the
Central District of California.77
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
73 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
74 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1-4) (2003).
75 Altmann 1,142 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
76 Altmann 11, 317 F. Supp. 3d 954, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002).
77 Id. at 962.
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Because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens did not bar the present
action, that all necessary parties had been joined, and that venue
was appropriate, this note will focus on the Ninth Circuit's
rationale in finding subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction to hear Altmann's claims. Part IV of this note will
also explain the significance of the court's interpretation of the
jurisdictional issues for future claims.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Retroactive
Application of the FSIA
Noting the deep-rooted "presumption against retroactive
legislation" in American jurisprudence,78 the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recently upheld the
retroactive application of a statute where it applies to events
occurring before the statute's enactment.7 9  Considering the
statute's legal effects on events occurring before the statute's
enactment, the Court in Landgraf v. UFI Products reasoned that
the retroactive application of a statute affecting the substantive
rights of the parties was impermissible while the application of a
statute altering the jurisdictional posture of the court was
permissible.80 Examining the jurisdictional character of the FSIA,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the FSIA was intended to
be applied to all cases decided after it was enacted, the FSIA's
purpose encompassed jurisdictional rather than liability concerns.81
In part, the act's purpose indicates that "[c]laims of foreign states
to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth
in this chapter. 8 2 Drawing on the language of the statute, the
Ninth Circuit followed the court's interpretation of the word
"henceforth" to conclude that "the FSIA is to be applied to all
cases decided after its enactment, i.e., regardless of when the
78 INS v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990)).
79 Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
80 See id. at 269.
81 See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (1994).
82 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2003).
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plaintiffs cause of action accrued."83
Finding retroactive application permissible, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished a line of pre-Landgraf decisions holding retroactive
application of the FSIA impermissible: "[T]he cases holding the
FSIA inapplicable to pre-1952 events involve economic
transactions entered into long before the facts of this case arose
and, unlike here, prior to the defendant country's acceptance of the
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity and to the widespread
acceptance of the restrictive theory. 84 The court noted that these
cases involved contract disputes and were "inapplicable in the
context of a claim like the international takings violation at issue
here."85 Furthermore, even if Austria expected to be immune from
suit in a foreign court, "such expectation would be due no
deference."86
Concluding that the FSIA was applicable to the facts, the Ninth
Circuit explored the basis of the expropriation exception to the
FSIA.87  Under the exception, the FSIA delineates three
requirements for a finding that a foreign state is subject to U.S.
jurisdiction: (1) rights in property taken in violation of
international law must be at issue; (2) property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state; and (3) the agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.88
After finding that "rights in property" were duly implicated in
this case,89 the court concluded that the paintings were taken in
violation of international law because they were arbitrarily
misappropriated in accordance with discriminatory policies.9"
Without contest from the Gallery, the court also found that the
Gallery was an "agency or instrumentality" as defined in the
83 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.
84 Altmann 11, 317 F. Supp. 3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2002).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 967-69.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2003).
89 Altmann II, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 967.
90 Id. at 967-68.
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statute. 91 Turning to the final prong of the analysis, the court
examined the Gallery's commercial activity in the United States to
determine whether it satisfied the definition of "commercial
activity" under the statute.92 Analyzing the nature of the activity, 93
the court ruled that the publication of museum books and the
museum's guidebook in the United States, the marketing of the
Klimt exhibition in the United States, the featuring of looted
works, and the capitalization on the portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer
I justified the court's exercise of jurisdiction under the
expropriation exception to the FSIA.94
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Although the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
determination that the court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendants, the Ninth Circuit employed a different approach to the
personal jurisdiction inquiry. As previously noted, the district
court concluded that because foreign states were not "persons" for
due process purposes, the court did not have to conduct a separate
constitutional due process inquiry to determine whether grounds
for personal jurisdiction existed.95  Under the district court's
analysis, as long as an exception to sovereign immunity applies,
91 Id. at 967; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2003). The statute defines an "agency or
instrumentality" as an
entity 1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined
in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title nor created under the laws of
any third country.
Id.
92 Altmann II, 317 F. Supp. 3d, at 968-69; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2003)
(defining "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act").
93 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (2003) (explaining that "the commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.").
94 Altmann II, 317 F. Supp. 3d, at 969-70. The court further noted that this
commercial activity exceeded the activity found sufficient to justify jurisdiction under
the FSIA in Siderman de Blake. Id. at 970-71.
95 SeeAlImann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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the constitutional due process requirements were satisfied.96
The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to accept the district
court's contention that foreign states are not "persons" for due
process purposes. Reemphasizing the constitutional due process
requirements necessary for the court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction, the court held that: "[a]ssuming that a foreign state is
a 'person' for purposes of the Due Process Clause... there must be
sufficient 'minimum contacts' between the foreign state and the
forum 'such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."97
IV. Analysis of the Differing Interpretations of Personal
Jurisdiction by the United States District Court for the
Central District of California and the Ninth Circuit
The district court's analysis of jurisdiction under the FSIA
arguably collapses the subject-matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction determinations into a single inquiry. Thus, where
service is properly made and one of the exceptions to the FSIA
applies to the plaintiffs claim, personal jurisdiction is
presumptively found.98 Relying on the legislative history of the
FSIA, the district court noted that "the intent of Congress was that
if one of the FSIA exceptions to immunity existed, the
constitutional due process requirements of personal jurisdiction
were satisfied."9 9 The following analysis challenges the district
court's personal jurisdiction test and suggests that in light of
United States personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the application
of personal jurisdiction in the international context, and the proper
interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting the FSIA, the Ninth
Circuit's rejection of the district court's view of personal
jurisdiction was the correct approach.
96 See id. at 1207.
97 Altmann11, 317 F. Supp. 3d, at 970.
98 See Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. at 1205-06.
99 Id. at 1206.
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A. Applicability of the Due Process Clause to Foreign
Sovereign Defendants: Personal Jurisdiction
1. History of Personal Jurisdiction in the United States
Drawing from principles of international law,'00 the nascent
personal jurisdiction doctrine in the United States regarded each
state as an individual sovereign. Scholars note that the theoretical
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction were derived from
international principles and that "inherent in these theories of
jurisdiction was the dominant theory of sovereignty and the
limitations of states' powers beyond their borders."'0 ' This idea
was captured in the seminal case, Pennoyer v. Neff.
One of these principles [of public law] is, that every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory .... The other principle of
public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is,
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory. 1
02
In 1945, the modem theory of personal jurisdiction evolved in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington"3 and its progeny cases.
International Shoe focused on ensuring that an absent defendant
had "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'0 4
Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court clarified the
minimum contacts analysis and notion of fairness in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,"°5 in which the Court noted that in
order to meet the minimum contacts test, a defendant must have
such purposeful contacts with the forum state such that he should
100 Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and
Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 799, 815 (1988).
101 Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person"? Does it Matter?: Personal
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 115, 127 (2001).
102 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
103 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, (1945).
104 Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
105 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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"reasonably anticipate" being haled into court.'0 6 In addition, the
Court enumerated five fairness factors that had to be met before
jurisdiction could lie in the forum state: 1) the burden on the
defendant; 2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 3)
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
4) the interstate judicial system's interest in the most efficient
resolution; and 5) the shared interest of the several states in
furnishing fundamental substantive policies. 1°7
Also central to the minimum contacts analysis is a court's
determination of the requisite connection between a state's
contacts with the forum state and the claim. In Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,10 8 the Court explained that
there are two categories of jurisdiction, depending on the state's
level of contacts with the forum:
[W]hen a state exercises jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum, the state is exercising 'specific jurisdiction.' . . . When a
State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum, the State has been said to be exercising 'general
jurisdiction' over the defendant.' 09
2. Minimum Contacts in the International Context
Applying the minimum contacts and fairness analyses to a case
involving a foreign defendant, the Court in Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court,"° found that additional concerns lie for
foreign parties in determining which contacts are sufficient to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction."' As scholars note, "[t]he
presence of a foreign defendant provides an extra heavy thumb on
106 Id. at 297. This test essentially involves the Court's consideration of an activity
in which the defendant has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege[s] of conducting
activities within the forum state [the laws of the United States]." Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
107 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp, 444 U.S. at 292.
108 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
109 Id. at 414 nn.8-9.
110 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
HI Id. at 115.
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the scale for purposes of reasonableness."'" 2  Also recognizing
such concern in cases implicating extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
Asahi Court noted, "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised
when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the
international field.""' 3  Exercising such care, circuit courts,
including the Second and Ninth Circuits have sought to clarify
which contacts are relevant to the due process inquiry when a
foreign defendant is involved." 4
In an attempt to clarify the nexus between the minimum
contacts analysis and constitutional due process concerns, the
Second Circuit considered a case arising "out of one of the most
enormous commercial disputes in history." "' In Texas Trading
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, the Second Circuit considered
whether the safeguards of due process are accorded to foreign
states, thus positing whether a foreign state is a "person" for
purposes of the Due Process Clause." 6 Recognizing that this
determination had ramifications for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction in an international context, the court noted:
Like the states of our nation, the United States is a member of an
international community. While it has not formally renounced
part of its long-arm power by signing an international
constitution, considerations of fairness nonetheless regulate
every exercise of the federal judicial machinery .... [H]ere we
see no reason to stray from our former adherence to the analysis
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment."1
7
Upholding constitutional protections in the international
context, the court engaged in a four part analysis of personal
112 LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 19 (Michie 1996).
113 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
114 The dominant view is that the relevant contacts are those within the entire United
States. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
314 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., 937
F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[w]here service is made under FSIA
section 1608, the relevant area in delineating contacts is in the entire United States, not
merely the forum state.").
115 Texas Trading Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir.
1981).
116 Id. at 313.
117 Id. at 315-16n.37.
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jurisdiction consistent with the minimum contacts inquiry first
articulated in International Shoe and later refined in subsequent
cases. Specifically, the court made the following four inquiries:
(1) did the defendants avail themselves of the privileges of
American law?; (2) was it foreseeable that they would face
litigation in the United States?; (3) what inconveniences do the
defendants face in litigating abroad?; and (4) what are the
countervailing interests of the United States in hearing the suit?" 8
While the district court in Altmann I engaged in a lengthy
analysis of cases in which courts have either assumed or
determined that a foreign sovereign is a "person" for purposes of
constitutional due process analysis, it arguably failed to consider
the questions raised in Texas Trading in holding that "foreign
sovereigns are not 'persons' for purposes of the Due Process
Clause."19
B. Altmann I's Distortion of the Due Process Inquiry
Refusing to dismiss Altmann's claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the district court in Altmann I found personal
jurisdiction proper without conducting a minimum contacts
analysis. The court noted that although the minimum contacts
analysis had been applied to foreign sovereign immunity cases
arising before 1992, the Supreme Court's reference to South
Carolina v. Katzenbach12 ° in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover 2'
has arguably altered the personal jurisdiction inquiry.'22
In determining whether the United States had personal
jurisdiction over a claim involving the issuance of Argentinean
debt instruments, the Weltover court applied the minimum contacts
analysis and found that Argentina had "purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the United
States."' 23 In the same breath, however, the Court suggested in
dicta that the test was arbitrary in light of the proposition stated in
118 Id. at 314.
119 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
120 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
121 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
122 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07.
123 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 620 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach twenty-six years earlier, that
"[s]tates of the Union are not 'persons' for purposes of the Due
Process Clause. 124
Katzenbach involved a constitutional challenge to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.125 South Carolina argued that the Act violated
individual due process rights by impermissibly delegating power,
limiting judicial access, and by acting as a bill of attainder. 126 In
particular, South Carolina claimed that the Act violated due
process because the word "person" did not encompass states of the
union. 127 Subsequently adopting South Carolina's contention, the
Court held that states of the union were not "persons" for due
process purposes. 128 Although Katzenbach presented a wholly
domestic issue that did not pertain to foreign states or the issue of
foreign sovereign immunity, some circuit courts have used the
Weltover Court's reference to Katzenbach as authority for the
notion that foreign states are not entitled to constitutional
protection. 1
2 9
Circuit courts' struggle to derive meaning from the Weltover
Court's reference to Katzenbach3 ° has prompted debate over
whether foreign states are "persons" entitled to due process in
United States courts. For instance, the Seventh Circuit in Afram v.
Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A. 3' conceded that
"[c]ountless cases assume that foreign companies have all the
rights of U.S. citizens to object to extraterritorial assertions of
personal jurisdiction. The assumption has never to our knowledge
been examined, but is probably too solidly entrenched to be
questioned at this late date .... ,,132 In response, the Ninth Circuit
questioned this assumption in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,133 when it determined that foreign sovereigns are not
124 383 U.S. at 323-24 (1966).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 323.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 323-24.
129 See Flatow v. Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19-21 (D.D.C. 1998).
130 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
131 772 F.2d 1358 (7 th Cir. 1985).
132 Id. at 1362.
133 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 21.
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"persons" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.134
Relying on the Supreme Court's analysis of state entitlement to
due process in Katzenbach, the Ninth Circuit in Flatow observed
that "[g]iven the parallels in the procedural deference granted to
both the United States and foreign states, this Court concludes that
foreign states should hold comparable status to States of the Union
and the federal government for the purposes of Constitutional Due
Process analysis."' 35
Following the Ninth's Circuit's lead in Flatow, the district
court in Altmann I also concluded that "a foreign state is not a
'person' under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution."' 36 This conclusion is flawed, however, because it
discounts Congress' intent to include a separate due process
inquiry under the FSIA in addition to establishing the statutory
basis for personal jurisdiction. 137
C. Congressional Intent in the Enactment of the FSIA
In its enactment of the FSIA, Congress envisioned a personal
jurisdiction inquiry consistent with due process considerations.'38
Explicitly noting International Shoe and its progeny cases, the
House Report indicates that:
The requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and
adequate notice are embodied in the provision. Cf. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). For
personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b), the claim
must first of all be one over which the district courts have
original jurisdiction under section 1330(a), meaning a claim for
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. Significantly,
each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605-1607,
requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United
States, or an express or implied waiver by the foreign state of its
immunity from jurisdiction. These immunity provisions,
therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 1187, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
137 See infra note 139.
138 See infra note 139.
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before our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction.139
The Flatow court interpreted the House Report as meaning
"that in personam jurisdiction has been accommodated inherently
within the statute."' 40 Once again relying on the Flatow court's
reading of the House Report, the Altmann I court failed to perform
an independent due process inquiry, arguing that "in personam
jurisdiction has been addressed within the requirements of the
statute. 14' Although the House Report unequivocally states that
"[t]he requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and
adequate notice are embodied in the provision, ' 142 it does not
dismiss the importance of a separate constitutional due process
inquiry in addition to the statutory threshold for personal
jurisdiction. 43 In other words, a court must engage in a two-part
inquiry whereby it must first consider whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is statutorily permissible and then determine
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally
permissible.'"
To satisfy the first inquiry, a court must consider 28 U.S.C. §
1330(b), which states that "personal jurisdiction over a foreign
state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district
courts have jurisdiction" pursuant to the exceptions of the FSIA,
and where service has been made. 145 Thus, where subject matter
jurisdiction exists and service has been properly executed, grounds
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction are established.'46
Once the grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction are
established, the second prong of the inquiry requires an assessment
of the minimum contacts sufficient to sustain personal
139 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13-14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6612, quoted in Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa
Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980).
140 Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 21.
141 Altmannl, 142 F. Supp. at 1208.
142 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6612.
143 See id. at 13-14.
144 See id.
145 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2000).
146 Under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, personal jurisdiction equals subject
matter jurisdiction plus valid service of process. See Shapiro v Republic of Bolivia, 930
F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991).
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jurisdiction. 147  According to the House Report, the immunity
exceptions "prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist
before our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction."' 148 Thus, once
personal jurisdiction is found under 1330(b), a court must next
compare the connection between the suit and the United States in
determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
constitutionally permissible.149
D. The Ninth Circuit's Adherence to Congressional Intent in
its Jurisdictional Analysis
Applying this two-part inquiry in Altmann II, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the Republic of Austria and the Gallery was proper.15 °
Conducting the first inquiry, the Ninth Circuit found that because
the paintings were subject to the expropriation exception of the
FSIA and because service was properly made,'51 the court had
established personal jurisdiction as prescribed by § 1330(b).1 52
Applying the second prong of the analysis, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
Republic and the Gallery complied with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment."'15
3
In its minimum contacts analysis, the court used the same
factors to determine whether the defendants engaged in
"commercial activity" as prescribed by the expropriation
exception.'54 The court explained, "[a]s previously noted, the
Gallery edits and publishes several publications in the United
States .... [T]he Gallery's publication and marketing of these
books is designed to solicit tourism .... [B]oth the Republic and
the Gallery profit from the sale of the books and the resulting
147 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6612.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Altmann I1, 317 F. Supp. 3d 954, 969 (9 th Cir. 2002)
151 See 28 U.S.C § 1608 (2000) (delineating service requirements of the FSIA).
152 Altmann H, 317 F.3d at 969.
153 Id. at 970.
154 Id.
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
United States tourism. '  In addition to the Gallery's activities in
the forum, the court stressed that the actions taken by the Republic
on behalf of the Gallery, such as the publication of a tourism
brochure featuring the portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer on the cover,
also supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction.'56  By
considering the latter activities in its analysis, the Ninth Circuit,
like the Second Circuit in Texas Trading, made clear that "it is not
only defendant's activities in the forum, but also actions relevant
to the transaction by an agent on defendant's behalf, which support
personal jurisdiction. ''57  Identifying the relevant contacts,
including "whose contacts, and with what,"' 58 the Ninth Circuit
also demonstrated that the contacts were sufficient to assert
specific jurisdiction over the defendants.159
In addition, the court stressed the fairness component of the
minimum contacts analysis 6 ° in its discussion of Austria's forum
non conveniens claim, noting that "Altmann's choice of forum
should not be disturbed unless, when weighing the convenience of
the parties and the interests of justice, 'the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant." 16' Echoing the International Shoe line of
cases, the court concluded that "[t]he Republic and the Gallery
have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States such that
maintenance of this suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'62 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
gave deference to congressional intent in enacting the FSIA and
upheld the notion that the strictures of domestic law apply to
foreign sovereigns.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
314 (2d Cir. 1981).
158 Id.
159 Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 969.
160 For a discussion of fairness concerns in conjunction with the minimum contacts
analysis, see infra Part IV(A).
161 Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 973 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
508 (1947)).
162 Id. at 970.
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V. Conclusion
Upholding congressional intent in enacting the FSIA, the Ninth
Circuit declared that the minimum contacts analysis is central to
the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction in an action
implicating the expropriation exception to the FSIA. 6 3  By
assuming rather than deciding that the defendants were entitled to
constitutional due process, however, the Ninth Circuit left open the
question whether foreign states are "persons" entitled to receive
the liberty protections of the Fifth Amendment. While federal
circuit courts continue to debate this question, the picture remains
unpainted by the Supreme Court.
As the Ninth Circuit's analysis indicates, the determination that
foreign sovereigns are entitled to due process is salient in
commercial cases. In cases such as Altmann H where the
application of the expropriation exceptions depends on the nexus
between the foreign defendant's commercial activities and the
United States, the defendant will be presumed to have had
sufficient contact with the United States, making minimum
contacts an appropriate threshold for the court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction. The minimum contacts analysis, however,
may not be proper where other exceptions to the FSIA are
invoked, such as the exception denying immunity to foreign states
engaged in terrorist-related activities.64
In April, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 165 which amended the FSIA by
adding an exception holding foreign sovereigns accountable for
terrorist-related activities. 16' This exception is different from the
commercial activity and expropriation exceptions because it does
not require a nexus between the activity giving rise to the suit and
the United States. Rather, courts may exercise personal
jurisdiction even if the act occurred in a foreign state.167 Because
of the extraterritorial nature of the exception, an analysis of
163 See id. at 969-71.
164 See 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7) (2000).
165 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1994) (codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7) (2000)).
166 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000) (including acts of "torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking," and the provision of resources).
167 See id.
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minimum contacts would be inconsistent with its extraterritorial
reach. Consequently, academic commentary suggests that the
norms of international law, rather than domestic constitutional law,
should limit personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign
defendant in U.S. courts.1
68
If the Supreme Court determines that foreign sovereigns are
not persons entitled to constitutional protection, the Court will
have to reconcile the intent of the FSIA drafters to incorporate the
International Shoe framework into the jurisdictional analysis under
the FSIA with the Court's denial of constitutional protections to
foreign sovereign defendants. The Court's response will be
particularly noteworthy in light of the 1996 amendments to the
FSIA, which suggest that the minimum contacts analysis may be
unworkable in cases where the anti-terrorism amendment to the
FSIA is implicated. In a time when claims relating to terrorism
flood U.S. courtrooms, the United States' adherence to
international law is being questioned. 169  Thus, the Court's
consideration of constitutional protections for foreign defendants
will likely determine whether domestic law or norms of
international law will define the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts.
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court adopts the Altmann 11
court's analysis, the Court will vindicate congressional intent as
well as affirm the notion enunciated in Texas Trading that all
actors in the world marketplace have the right to be treated as
equals. 7 ° In the commercial realm, retention of the minimum
contacts analysis would allow federal courts to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant while adhering to the
jurisdictional nexus requirements of the FSIA. Thus, litigation
168 See Halverson, supra note 101 at 142-5 1.
169 See D.C. Circuit Holds That a Foreign State Is Not a "Person" Under the Due
Process Clause, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1517, 1521 (2003) (citing Editorial, Bending the
Geneva Rules, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2002, at B6 ("criticizing the Bush administration's
decision not to treat Taliban and al Qaeda detainees as prisoners of war under the Geneva
Convention"); Editorial, The Law Applies to All, TORONTO STAR, June 23, 2002, at A12
("denouncing American opposition to the International Criminal Court"); Editorial,
Overwrought on the Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A18 ("criticizing
State Department efforts to intimidate other countries into accepting U.S. immunity from
ICC prosecution"); Phil Shiner, Can We Bomb Iraq?, TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 2002, at
3 ("arguing that a preemptive strike against Iraq would violate international law")).
170 See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981).
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invoking the FSIA would proceed in a forum where "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice"' 7 ' dictate that foreign
sovereigns stand on constitutional ground in U.S. courtrooms.
IRENE P. KING
171 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
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